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Higher temperatures expected by midcentury increase the risk of shocks to crop
production, while the interconnected nature of the current global food system functions
to spread the impact of localized production shocks throughout the world. In this study,
we analyze the global potential impact of a present-day event of equivalent magnitude to
the US Dust Bowl, modeling the ways in which a sudden decline in US wheat production
could cascade through the global network of agricultural trade. We use observations of
country-level production, reserves, and trade data in a Food Shock Cascade model to
explore trade adjustments and country-level inventory changes in response to a major,
multiyear production decline. We find that a 4-year decline in wheat production of the
same proportional magnitude as occurred during the Dust Bowl greatly reduces both
wheat supply and reserves in the United States and propagates through the global trade
network. By year 4 of the event, US wheat exports fall from 90.5 trillion kcal before
the drought to 48 trillion to 52 trillion kcal, and the United States exhausts 94% of
its reserves. As a result of reduced US exports, other countries meet their needs by
leveraging their own reserves, leading to a 31% decline in wheat reserves globally. These
findings demonstrate that an extreme production decline would lead to substantial supply
shortfalls in both the United States and in other countries, where impacts outside the
United States strongly depend on a country’s reserves and on its relative position in the
global trade network.
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INTRODUCTION
Food production is vulnerable to climate change and associated
extreme weather events. Crops are highly sensitive to
temperature, rainfall, and soil characteristics, which means
that production is likely to decline during periods of drought,
heavy rainfall, and extreme temperature, and any resultant
flooding, pest outbreaks, or erosion events (Lobell et al., 2011;
Wheeler and von Braun, 2013; Sundström et al., 2014; Pacetti
et al., 2017). Livestock are also vulnerable to extreme events
such as heat stress, which affects production levels and animal
health (Nardone et al., 2010; Renaudeau et al., 2012), and rainfall
variability, which impacts pastures, forage crops, and feed grain
production (Henry et al., 2012). Furthermore, both marine and
inland fisheries are impacted by climate, with increased ocean
temperatures changing the distribution and health of fish species
(Brander, 2007; Bell et al., 2013) and rainfall and temperature
shifting the spatial distribution and timing of migration and
spawning of inland fish (Lynch et al., 2016).
The tight coupling between environmental conditions and
food production yields makes it essential to understand the
impacts of sudden disruptions, or shocks, to the production
of crops, livestock, and fish. Environmental shock events have
increased in frequency since the 1970s (Gephart et al., 2017;
Cottrell et al., 2019), with local to global impacts. Shocks
affect local food security by damaging or destroying agricultural
infrastructure and assets, including standing crops, livestock,
farming equipment, and fishing boats (FAO, 2015). Subsequent
decreases in crop, livestock, and fishery production directly
threaten subsistence consumption and can lead to local food
price spikes. Resultant reductions of income and loss of
livelihoods serve to amplify these impacts (FAO, 2015).
In addition to local outcomes, the effects of production
shocks can propagate in the international food trade network,
as countries seek to minimize losses in their food supply. In
2010, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) ministers
declared that trade “plays a key role in achieving food security”
(APEC, 2010). While international trade generally enhances food
availability (Porkka et al., 2013) by increasing the diversity of
food supplies (Kearney, 2010) and helping to buffer the impacts
of local resource deficits and production shocks (Allan, 1998;
Porkka et al., 2017), trade also serves to expose populations
to food production disruptions globally. Increased trade has
also introduced fragility to the global food system (Fader et al.,
2013; Puma et al., 2015; Suweis et al., 2015), putting populations
at risk not only of extreme weather events but also of the
loss of resilience in the food system as a result of trade
dependency, increased connectivity, and decreased modularity
in the international food trade network (Suweis et al., 2015; Tu
et al., 2019). Marchand et al. (2016) found that trade flows, as well
as food reserves, are key factors affecting a country’s exposure to
production shocks; also, high reliance on imports can accentuate
the risk of critical food supply losses (Gephart et al., 2016; Tamea
et al., 2016).
Indeed, in 2007 and 2010, extreme local environmental
conditions (e.g., droughts, extensive wildfires) and the resultant
declines in regional production combined with a range of other
factors, including speculation and trade restrictions, caused a
spike in global food prices (Tadesse et al., 2014). Although food
supply shocks are not always strongly coupled to commodity
price changes, when a food supply shock does result in
commodity price increases, poorer countries are at increased risk
of food insecurity (Distefano et al., 2018). D’Odorico et al. (2019)
raise the concern about how, under unfair policies, international
trade might aggravate cross-country food inequality, but also
highlight the potential that international trade has to reduce this
type of inequality and become an effective tool for the fulfillment
of the global right to food.
CLIMATE DISRUPTIONS TO FOOD
SECURITY
While the 2015 Paris Agreement aims to increase “the ability to
adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate
resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in
a manner that does not threaten food production” (UNFCCC,
2015), scientists agree that the rapidly changing climate means
that the world’s food security is increasingly at risk. Global food
security faces the increased frequency of extreme weather events
(IPCC, 2019).
History offers numerous examples of the deleterious effects
of extreme weather on food production, from the Dust Bowl
in the 1930s United States to the 2011 drought in East Africa.
Such severe temperature and rainfall anomalies affect agricultural
production and food security within the affected regions and in
contemporary extreme weather events have far reaching effects
through global trade. The 2010 drought in Russia, for instance,
resulted in export bans and global price increases (Wegren, 2011),
and the 2012 drought in theMidwestern United States resulted in
sharper increases in food prices than previous production shocks
of similar magnitude (Boyer et al., 2013).
The US Dust Bowl
The US Dust Bowl of the 1930s provides a stark example of an
extreme weather event’s impact on US agricultural production.
The “Dust Bowl” refers to a series of critical extreme events
that led to steep crop yield declines and major societal impacts
including human migration. Although the North American
Great Plains often experience drought, the Dust Bowl event
was a deviation from typical La Niña conditions (Bennett,
1938; Schubert et al., 2004b; Worster, 2004; Cook et al., 2009).
Persistent, large-scale drought conditions of low rainfall and high
temperatures impacted the Great Plains region, particularly the
states of Kansas, Colorado, Oklahoma, Texas, and New Mexico,
with distinct and intense drought events during 1930–1931,
1933–1934, and 1936 (Riebsame et al., 1991; Schubert et al.,
2004b; Glotter and Elliott, 2016).
The severe weather events associated with the Dust Bowl
affected major agricultural producing areas of the United States,
and as such, declines in national agricultural productivity were
substantial. During the 1930s, wheat and maize production
declined by up to 36 and 48%, respectively, relative to the average
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yearly production from 1921 to 1930 (USDA, 2019b). Human-
induced land degradation, in combination with the drought-
induced loss of vegetation, caused large-scale dust storms while
also contributing a feedback effect that further amplified the
drought (Cook et al., 2009). Furthermore, high winds eroded
480 tons of topsoil per acre on average in the southern plains,
degrading soil fertility and air quality in the region (Hansen and
Libecap, 2004).
The consequences of the drought on food supply and
environmental conditions had direct impacts on livelihoods and
health, resulting in substantial migration of people from the
region. Even with the return of wetter weather, the loss of topsoil
slowed economic and agricultural recovery in heavily affected
areas (Hornbeck, 2012). Dust Bowl–affected states experienced
net population losses through the 1930s, and within affected
states, the share of rural populations declined, a trend that began
in the 1930s and continued throughout the twentieth century
(Parton et al., 2007; McLeman et al., 2014).
Risks for Global Food Security
Following World War II, the United States shaped the
postwar international food order, becoming a central player in
international food aid and trade (Friedmann, 1982). Over the
second half of the twentieth century, through the influence
of US policies regarding grain exports, the direction of
trade, particularly of grains, shifted to flow toward developing
countries. Export subsidies created new markets for US
agricultural goods and substantially increased the amount of food
imports globally, most dramatically global imports of wheat from
the United States and other developed nations (Winders, 2009).
While the policies governing agricultural trade have changed over
time, the United States remains central to international food
trade, especially for staple commodities.
Because of the interconnected nature of the global food
system and the role of the United States as a major exporter of
agricultural products, disruptions to US production can have far-
reaching impacts. The United States is a major exporter of staple
foods, accounting for around 37, 17, and 16% of internationally
traded soy, maize, and wheat, respectively, in 2013 (FAOSTAT,
2019c). From 2012 to 2016, the United States exported wheat
and wheat products to 174 different countries (Figure 1) and
maize and maize products to 162 countries over the same
period (FAOSTAT, 2019b). Using the 2009 cereal trade network,
Marchand et al. (2016) simulate the effects of production shocks
in different origin countries. They found that themost substantial
supply declines in trade partners are caused by shocks that induce
a production drop in the United States.
US production of crops—particularly staple crops of wheat,
maize, and soy—remains heavily centered in the Great Plains
region (USDA, 2016). This region has experienced periodic
drought throughout the twentieth century to present, including
severe droughts in the 1950s, 1988, and 2012 (Rosenzweig et al.,
2001; Schubert et al., 2004a; Hoerling et al., 2012). Agricultural
production in the Great Plains shifted over the twentieth
FIGURE 1 | US wheat export destinations in trillions of kcal based on 2012–2016 yearly average from FAOSTAT detailed trade matrix.
Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems | www.frontiersin.org 3 March 2020 | Volume 4 | Article 26
Heslin et al. Dust Bowl
century to rely heavily on irrigation from the Ogallala aquifer,
buffering the impacts of droughts on agricultural production
since the Dust Bowl (Hornbeck and Keskin, 2014). However,
variability in temperature and rainfall, both droughts and floods,
as well as the related spread of agricultural pests and diseases,
continues to affect agricultural production (Rosenzweig et al.,
2001). Additionally, aquifer overexploitation occurring in the
Great Plains, particularly during times of drought, threatens
the ability of groundwater to continue buffering the effects of
drought on American agricultural production (Scanlon et al.,
2012). Given the central role of the United States in the
international agricultural trade, the consequences of a large-scale
production shock would extend far beyond US consumption and
food security.
Quantitative studies that assess the implications of specific
natural disasters on food security via food production and trade
are particularly useful, yet scarce (exceptions include Puma et al.,
2015; Gephart et al., 2016, and Suweis et al., 2015). Assessing
the potential impact of extreme weather events not only on food
production, but also on the global trade system, is critical for
understanding the far-reaching effects of production shocks in a
globalized economy. This article aims to contribute to the nascent
literature connecting climate shocks to food supply and trade
throughmodeling the changes in international trade and reserves
in response to a Dust Bowl–sized shock on contemporary
US production.
METHODS
Our analysis uses historical data on global wheat production,
trade, and reserves to create an initial state into which we
introduce production shocks.We use the historical USDust Bowl
as a temporal analog event for US production declines (e.g., Puma
and Gold, 2011). The sizes of the production declines are based
on observed data of percentage declines in production during
the Dust Bowl relative to a 1921–1930 baseline period, which
is imposed on contemporary US production values. We then
simulate the cascading effects of such a disruption through the
international trade network of wheat.
Simulation Model
Similar to the model of Marchand et al. (2016), we simulate
the cascading effects of a food production shock through the
global food trade network using the Food Shock Cascade (FSC)
model. In this model, a shortage in food supply can be either (a)
absorbed at the national level (by spending reserves or reducing
consumption of the particular commodity) or (b) propagated to
trade partners by decreasing exports and increasing imports.
The model is initialized with a trade network that has a set of
state variables defined at the national level (i.e., each node in the
network): production P, reserves R, and domestic consumption
C, as well as a trade matrix F, where Fij is the quantity exported
from country i to country j. Total exports (E) and imports (I) by
country correspond, respectively, to the row and column sums of
F. The production, reserves, and trade data are based on public
databases (see below), whereas consumption is set to match the
initial net supply (S):
C = S = P + I − E−1R
We further assume that the net transfer to reserves (1R) is zero
initially, so that C = P + I - E for all countries at the start of
the simulation.
The simulation is defined as a sequence of behaviors that starts
with countries with supply shortages (S < C) making attempts
to resolve shortages, where the initial shortage deficit is due to
a specified drop in production. In simulating the effects of the
production decline, we model two different potential pathways
through which countries, after first accessing their available
reserves, could adjust their trade flows. In the Proportional Trade
Allocation (PTA) version of the FSC model, countries adjust
their imports and exports simultaneously, increasing imports
from trading partners without supply shortages themselves and
decreasing exports across all links by an equal proportion of
existing trade on each link. In this way, countries in the FSC-
PTA model divide the shock absorption between their imports
and exports, transmitting shocks both upstream (by increasing
imports) and downstream (by decreasing exports). These trade
adjustments are relative to initial trade, capping import increases
at 100% of initial trade volume. In the Reserves-based Trade
Allocation (RTA) version, any country with the production shock
first reduces its exports only, propagating the supply shock
downstream to all receiving trade partners. At this stage, all
countries with a shortage increase their imports. The level of
import increases in the FSC-RTA are not based on prior trade
levels, as in the PTA version, but instead based on the amount of
reserves trading partners have available.
The sequence of steps for each model is detailed below. Note
that the national supply and shortage status of each country is
updated after each step, and each step applies only to countries
with an ongoing shortage.
FSC-PTA Model
1. Countries draw from their available reserves (a model
parameter set to 50% of total reserves).
2. Where shortage remains,
a. If shortage is <0.001% of domestic consumption (a
model parameter), countries reduce consumption to
absorb shortage.
b. If shortage is>0.001% of domestic consumption, countries
reduce their exports and increase their imports from
countries with available reserves by X% (where X is as high
as required to absorb shortage, up to 100%).
3. Repeat from (a) until no further changes occur in the
trade matrix.
4. All remaining shortages are absorbed at the national level by
reducing consumption.
FSC-RTAModel
1. Countries with production shocks draw from their available
reserves (a model parameter set to 50% of total reserves).
2. Where shortage remains,
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a. If shortage is <0.001% of domestic consumption (a
model parameter), countries reduce consumption to
absorb shortage.
b. If shortage is>0.001% of domestic consumption, countries
reduce their exports proportionally (same % decrease for
all outgoing trade links).
3. Countries with a shortage from trade changes in (2b) draw
from their available reserves
4. Where shortage remains,
a. If shortage is<0.001% of domestic consumption, countries
reduce consumption to absorb shortage.
b. If shortage is>0.001% of domestic consumption, countries
request additional imports from incoming trade links (see
below for a description of this process).
5. Countries with a shortage from trade changes in (4b) draw
from their available reserves.
6. Where shortage remains,
a. If shortage is<0.001% of domestic consumption, countries
reduce consumption to absorb shortage.
b. If shortage is<0.001% of domestic consumption, countries
reduce their exports proportionally (same % decrease for
all outgoing trade links).
7. Repeat from (3) until no further changes occur in the
trade matrix.
8. All remaining shortages are absorbed at the national level by
reducing consumption.
The consumption reduction steps were introduced to allow for
very small shortages (0.001% of domestic consumption) to be
absorbed locally rather than propagated through the network.
The process by which countries with a shortage can increase
imports (step (4b) in FSC-RTA) is modeled as follows:
i. For each country, define the additional imports needed (=
current shortage) or the amount available for additional
exports (set as 20% of current reserves).
ii. Countries with available amounts offer them to importers
with unmet need, proportionally to the existing quantity
traded on each link.
iii. If step (ii) results in a requesting country receiving more than
they need, they accept the same fraction of all offers to obtain
needed amount.
iv. Repeat from (i) until all needs are met or all available
amounts have been allocated.
For simulations of multiyear shocks, as in the Dust Bowl analog
event, subsequent runs of the model use initial country-level
production P and consumption C, as well as the initial trade
matrix F. Reserve levels R are updated to reflect the declines in
reserves from the previous model run.
From simulations of production shocks, we use changes in
reserve levels to calculate the stocks-to-use (STU) ratio both
globally and by country as a measure of the risk to food security
from such shocks. The STU ratio indicates the quantity of reserve
crop relative to the demand, calculated in our analysis as the total
available reserves over the initial consumption needs:
STU0 =
R0
C0
and STUt=4 =
R0 +
∑t=4
t=11 Rt
C0
Data
The initial state of the trade network into which Dust Bowl–size
production anomalies are introduced is created from observed
data of production, reserves, and trade over the 5-year period
from 2012 to 2016. Production and bilateral trade data come
from the FAOSTAT online database (FAOSTAT, 2019a,b). Wheat
production values are converted from metric tons (MT) to kcal
by commodity-specific calorie conversions (FAO, 2019) and
averaged over 2012 to 2016 to smooth yearly fluctuations. Wheat
trade data are aggregated for wheat and six wheat commodities
by converting each to kcal and summing the values. The sum is
assigned to a specific directed country-pair forming a weighted
and directed network, where values are associated with each
network link, and the links connect nodes in a specific direction
(see Konar et al., 2011 for additional example). The weights are
based on mean traded values over a 5-year interval to account
for the dynamic nature of the trade network, proportioning the
trade along links according to how active countries are within the
5-year period.
We obtain country-level wheat reserve data from the
USDA Foreign Agricultural Service—Production, Supply, and
Distribution database, using the mean “ending stocks” of wheat
from 2012 to 2016 (USDA, 2019a). The USDA reserves data
provide one aggregate value of wheat reserves for the European
Union, which we apportion to European Union member
countries proportional to their wheat production over the same
time period.
To simulate the effects of a Dust Bowl–size production shock,
we use historical data of wheat production from the USDA
National Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA, 2019b). The
values of production loss used in the simulation correspond to
the percentage change in the production of wheat during the
height of the Dust Bowl effects on wheat production: 1933, 1934,
1935, and 1936 (highlighted in red in Figure 2). The percent
decline introduced into themodel is calculated from the observed
production each year relative to a baseline of the average yearly
production in the decade preceding the Dust Bowl, 1921–1930
(Table 1).
RESULTS
We use the software R (R Core Team, 2019) to perform all data
processing and simulations of the FSC model. Results from two
model versions (the FSC-PTA model and the FSC-RTA model)
are reported below, corresponding to two alternative ways that we
propose countries could adjust trade flows in response to global
supply shocks.
Global Effects
In simulating a US Dust Bowl–sized production shock, we
introduce a decline in US wheat production for 4 consecutive
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FIGURE 2 | US wheat production from 1920 to 1940 in metric tons based on data from the USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA, 2019b).
TABLE 1 | US Dust Bowl Wheat Production USDA National Agricultural Statistics
Service.
Yield (MT) Percent decline (%)
Mean 1921–1930 22,501,128 -
1933 15,028,807 33
1934 14,316,768 36
1935 17,097,512 24
1936 17,142,499 24
years, keeping all other countries’ production at their initial level.
The initial production level of wheat for the United States, equal
to the yearly mean from 2012 to 2016 observed production data,
is 196 trillion kcal, or 58.7 million MT. In the first year of the
Dust Bowl, US wheat production declined by 33%, equivalent to
a contemporary supply shortage of 64.7 trillion kcal. Production
declines peaked at 36% in year 2, leading to a shortage in our
model of slightly over 70 trillion kcal. Years 3 and 4 experienced
equal shock sizes of 24%, a shortage of 47 trillion kcal when
applied to contemporary US production.
A production decline of this magnitude has major effects both
domestically in the United States and internationally because of
the central role of the United States in global wheat trade. In the
initial state of the model, based on 2012–2016 observed data,
the United States is the world’s largest exporter of wheat and
wheat products, exporting more than 90 trillion kcal a year on
average to a total of 174 countries out of the 217 countries in the
trade network. In addition, the United States is the 12th largest
importer of wheat and wheat products, importing more than 15
trillion kcal per year. In the FSC-PTA model, the production
decline in the United States is transmitted equally to countries to
import and export partners, drawing more imports and reducing
exports. With this model, in year 4 of the simulation, US wheat
exports fall to 53.4 trillion kcal, and imports increase to 19 trillion
kcal, moving the United States to the eighth largest importer of
wheat globally. In the FSC-RTA model, after accessing available
reserves, the United States addresses additional shortages by
decreasing exports, resulting in US exports declining to 48.3
trillion kcal, whereas imports remain unchanged. For both model
versions, the United States drops from the largest wheat exporter
to the fifth largest exporter behind Canada, Russia, France,
and Australia.
Table 2 presents key networkmetrics of the global wheat trade
for the undisturbed trade network and at the end of the 4-year
simulation for both the FSC-PTA and FSC-RTA models. The
node degree is the number of trade partners of each country, a
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TABLE 2 | Global wheat network metrics for the baseline state and after 4 years
of simulation for the FSC-PTA model and the FSC-RTA model.
Network metric Symbol Baseline FSC-PTA FSC-RTA
Total trade (kcal) gtotal 6.64 × 10
14 6.43 × 1014 6.51 × 1014
Number of nodes N 217 217 217
Number of links L 8,190 7,893 8,190
Number of
exporting nodes
Nout 162 144 162
Number of
importing nodes
Nin 217 217 217
Mean trade degree kmean 37.7 36.4 37.7
Max trade degree kmax 187 187 187
Mean export
degree
kmeanout 37.7 36.4 37.7
Max export degree Kmaxout 115 101 115
Mean import
degree
kmeanin 75.5 72.7 75.5
Max import degree kmaxin 289 275 289
Mean trade
strength (kcal)
smean 3.06 × 1012 2.96 × 1012 3.00 × 1012
Max trade strength
(kcal)
smax 9.06 × 1013 7.39 × 1013 7.42 × 1013
Mean export
strength (kcal)
smaxin 3.06 × 10
12 2.96 × 1012 3.00 × 1012
Max export
strength (kcal)
smaxout 3.54 × 10
13 3.42 × 1013 3.44 × 1013
Mean import
strength (kcal)
smeanin 6.12 × 10
12 5.92 × 1012 6.00 × 1012
Max import
strength (kcal)
smaxin 1.06 × 10
14 7.66 × 1013 7.59 × 1013
metric that indicates how central a node (i.e., country) is to the
network (e.g., Konar et al., 2011). Node strength is the weight
(in kilocalories) assigned to each link in the network. For both
node degree and strength, we then distinguish among (1) the
undirected node degree (k) and strength (s), (2) the outgoing
or exporting node degree (kout) and strength (sout), and (3) the
incoming or importing node degree (kin) and strength (sin). The
changes in connectivity associated with each model version are
significantly different. While both models lead to reductions in
trade flows (as indicated by the six “strength” metrics), the FSC-
RTA version does not have any changes to unweighted network
connectivity (i.e., the number of links and “degree” metrics).
Specifically, the FSC-RTA version maintains trade linkages, even
though trade flows are reduced. In contrast, we find notable
reductions in connectivity with the FSC-PTA version.
The central initial role of the United States in the global trade
network causes large impacts on global reserves. As countries
fill shortfalls in supply by accessing their wheat reserves (up to
50% per year), wheat reserves globally decline over the simulation
by 229 trillion kcal, or 68.5 million MT. This is a loss of 31%
of global wheat stocks over a 4-year period. The declines in
reserves are captured in a decrease in the global STU ratio
over the simulations. The global preshock STU ratio is 0.307,
which means that before the production shock country reserves
are 30.7% of global annual consumption needs. Following the
4-year production declines in the United States, the global STU
decreases to 0.212, or 21.2% of global consumption.
In both model versions, when countries are unable to fill
shortages through reserves or trade reallocation, they reduce
consumption. Consumption reductions in the FSC-PTA total
10.5 billion kcal, and the FSC-RTA model, total 150 million
kcal. In the event of subsequent year production declines or
concurrent production shocks globally, in which reserve levels
further decline, sharp decreases in consumption would follow.
As it stands, initial reserve levels are sufficiently high to shield
the global food system from significant consumption declines.
Country-Level Effects
At the country level, vulnerability to supply shocks and the ability
to shield those shocks from impacting domestic consumption
depend heavily on the initial quantity of reserves held by the
country, as well as the trade links from which to receive a
shock and upon which to draw additional supply. Of the 131
countries with wheat reserves in the initial state, all 131 used
some portion of their reserves in response to the US shortage.
Fifty-two countries used more than 75% of their reserves under
FSC-PTA model assumptions, and 36 countries used more
than 75% of their reserves in the FSC-RTA model, over the 4
years simulated (Figure 3). The United States, where the shock
originated, fully utilized the 50% of reserves available at each
year iteration before adjusting trade, resulting in a 93.75% total
reduction in reserves over 4 years. An additional 16 and 17
countries maximally reduced their reserves with the FSC-PTA
and FSC-RTA, respectively.
Accordingly, the STU ratio declined substantially in many
countries. Of those countries with nonzero initial STU (i.e.,
countries with initial reserves), countries’ STU ratios declined on
average 0.085 (FSC-PTA model) and 0.067 (FSC-RTA model).
The 10 countries with the highest initial reserves, serving a
critical role in absorbing shortages, experienced mean STU ratio
declines of 0.219 in the FSC-PTA and 0.145 in the FSC-RTA
model (Table 3). In the FSC-PTA, countries access their reserves
to meet new trade demands relative to their existing trade levels
with partner countries with a maximum of 100% increase to
trade flows on a given link. In the FSC-RTA, countries will
change trade relative to their reserve levels, accessing up to
20% of their reserves to meet increased demands from trade
partners. Depending on the initial levels of trade, reserves,
and consumption, as well as existing levels of trade with the
United States, these alternative systems of trade reallocation
result in differences in STU change between the two models.
Countries without reserves to buffer the effects of a shortage
turn directly to trade adjustments followed by consumption
declines to address the supply shock. Given the high initial
starting point of global reserves, most supply shocks, even in
countries without reserves, could be addressed through trade
flow adjustments. Total decreases in consumption only exceeded
the yearly 0.001% of supply threshold (which the models deduct
from consumption rather than adjusting trade flows) in six
countries in the FSC-PTA model and one country in the FSC-
RTA model. Countries experiencing any consumption declines
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FIGURE 3 | Total fractional change in reserves relative to initial reserves for the FSC-PTA and FSC RTA models.
over the 4 years, both above and below the threshold, are shown
in Figure 4.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we simulate the effects of a hypothetical multiyear
production decline in US wheat production of equal magnitude
to that which occurred during the US Dust Bowl of the 1930s.
Historical data on crop yield in the United States provided the
percentage of wheat lost during the height of the Dust Bowl
relative to the prior decade baseline. Introducing shocks of
this size into consecutive years of contemporary US production
affects both US reserves and those of its trading partners.
We used two different model versions for the simulations,
representing two potential pathways through which countries
may adapt to shortages in supply. In both model versions,
countries with shortages first draw from available reserves before
adjusting their trade flows. Differences in trade reallocation
affect the outcomes of the simulation for particular countries,
while the overall post-shock picture is similar. In the FSC-
PTA model, shocked countries decrease exports and increase
imports simultaneously by an equal percentage of existing flows
(as in Marchand et al., 2016). In FSC-RTA model, countries
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with production shocks first decrease their exports, after which
countries that received supply shortages from trade changes
increase imports from their other trade partners. In both model
TABLE 3 | Stocks to use in highest reserves countries.
Initial STU Final STU FSC-PTA Final STU FSC-RTA
China 0.628 0.591 0.493
United States 0.636 0.040 0.040
India 0.187 0.176 0.163
Iran 0.576 0.567 0.508
Canada 0.609 0.059 0.367
Russia 0.174 0.091 0.129
Morocco 0.505 0.472 0.479
Australia 0.741 0.148 0.642
Egypt 0.221 0.161 0.149
Algeria 0.414 0.286 0.365
versions, countries increase and decrease trade flows on existing
trade links, without establishing new trade partners. The FSC-
RTAmodel introduced a more flexible trade reallocation that was
not based on prior trade volume but instead on a percentage of
the trade partners’ available food stocks. With this simulation
model, up to 20% of reserves could be offered to trade partners
facing a shortage regardless of the prior trade flow with those
partners. Because of this 20% cap on reserve use for trade, the
distribution of reserve declines globally changes, whereas the
overall reductions in global reserves are the same.
In the 4-year simulation, >30% of global wheat reserves
are used in order to meet demand, with reserve decreases in
every country holding wheat reserves in the initial state of
the model. While countries may turn to trade as a means to
address food insecurity domestically, trade exposes countries to
foreign production shocks. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
countries, for instance, in their 2010 Ministerial Meeting on
Food Security outlined the importance of globalization and
open trade for ensuring access to food (APEC, 2010). In the
FIGURE 4 | Countries with consumption declines from shock to US wheat production using the FSC-PTA and FSC-RTA models.
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initial period, APEC countries (excluding the United States)
imported 150 trillion kcal of wheat per year and had a mean
country STU ratio of 0.27 (ΣSTU0/n) and a total overall STU
ratio of 0.48 (ΣR0/ΣC0). After the 4-year simulation, the
mean country STU ratio in APEC countries (excluding the
United States) fell from 0.27 to 0.08 (FSC-PTA model) and
0.12 (FSC-RTA model), and the total STU ratio fell from the
initial 0.48 to 0.37 (FSC-PTAmodel) and 0.35 (FSC-RTAmodel).
Although trade may serve to supplement domestic production
and increase food security, it also exposes these populations
to supply shocks in the United States, reducing regional wheat
stocks by approximately 25%.
While countries throughout the trade network are affected
by the cascading shock, the initial level of US wheat reserves
decreases the effects of the shock on US trade partners’ reserves
and consumption. The United States in the initial state has the
second largest wheat stocks in the world, and, by addressing
production shocks first through reserves, the supply shortages
passed from the United States into the global market are lower
than in a scenario in which the United States has limited reserves.
In absorbing somuch of the shock domestically, the United States
depletes nearly all of its wheat reserves. The decreases in post-
shock levels of reserves, both in the United States and globally,
have consequences for future shocks and global prices. Stocks-
to-use ratios correlate more closely with global prices than
production data (Bobenrieth et al., 2013). Such correlation
implies that the effects of an extreme event on the global market
may persist beyond production recovering in the form of price
spikes and volatility due to a lower STU ratio. With lower global
reserves of wheat, prices would be more volatile in response
to subsequent production fluctuations throughout the global
system (Wright and Cafiero, 2011). In addition to the role of
reserves in influencing price increases, large demand surges in the
trade network are also shown to increase global prices (Headey,
2011).
While our model and results have implications for the prices
of such globally traded commodities, our simulation does not
account for such changes in global prices when adjusting trade
volumes. We recognize that changes in prices would likely affect
the extent to which countries could increase imports during
times of shortages, which, therefore, represents a limitation of
the model. In such a scenario of increased prices, we would also
expect consumption declines above those in our simulations.
Additionally, the models function such that all countries with
sufficient reserves are willing to increase exports to their trade
partners with supply shortages. This does not account for other
actor responses, such as hoarding, or for preferential trade
relationships beyond those reflected in the initial trade volume
on each link.
Importantly, we note that any changes to food production,
trade, and reserves will lead to impacts that extend beyond
reducing exposure to global food shocks. Indeed, a range of
negative impacts are possible, including increased depletion
of local water resources, reduced ecosystem services, larger
rates of food spoilage, and increased exposure to local climate
extremes. It is therefore essential not to consider “food self-
sufficiency” as a binary decision; rather, it is a continuum where
countries need to take a nuanced view, balancing trade-offs
to identify the optimal solution for their context (Clapp,
2017).
CONCLUSION
Given the level of contemporary international trade in staple
agricultural products, such as wheat, production declines in
major exporting countries can have major consequences on the
global food system. This study provides an example scenario
of a production decline analogous to what occurred during the
multiyear extreme weather event of the Dust Bowl, modeling
the effects on global trade, reserves, and consumption. In our
simulations, the United States nearly depletes its reserves and
passes the shortage along to its many trading partners by
decreasing exports.
Following such an extreme production decline, US
consumption and trade partners are at increased risk of future
production shocks, given the near-total depletion of reserves. In
addition to the potential effects on future consumption, a severe
production shock itself can have lasting impacts on producers
from lost income and damaged cropland. Outside the directly
impacted country, trade partners affected by reduced imports or
increased export demands access reserves to address their supply
shortages, also becoming more vulnerable to future shocks due to
the lack (or reduction) of a buffer to insulate the population from
future supply declines. Countries’ strategic need for reserves to
protect against future production and trade shocks may prompt
increased import demands, decreased exports, or increased
domestic production in the following years to replenish depleted
grain stocks. Such production and trade changes carry economic
and environmental consequences.
The Dust Bowl simulation, while a massive reduction in
production levels, directly affected only one country, which began
with comparatively high levels of reserves. With increasing global
temperatures, the likelihood of simultaneous production losses
in major producing countries increases (Tigchelaar et al., 2018).
In such an event, with multiple producing countries decreasing
exports, the trade system would exhaust available reserves, and
countries would face consumption declines.
We use the example of the US Dust Bowl to model the effects
of a contemporary shock of equivalent production declines;
however, our approach can be applied to any shock scenario to
test the resilience of the trade network and identify potential
weaknesses in it. Simulating the effects of such production losses
in different producing areas of the world can help in identifying
vulnerabilities of food supply to extreme events and target reserve
levels to protect populations from food supply crises.
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